Into LLMs 5

On Bayes and Security in LLMs

CUNEF and DataLab ICMAT-CSIC

Our journey into LLMs

1. Recurrent neural networks
2. Transformers
3. GPT and BERTA
4. Finetuning LLMs

Table 2 Results over the IMDb test set

Model	Test accuracy
LSTM	81.99%
Simple transformer	87.49%
RoBERTa	94.67%

5. Bayes and LLMs. Security and LLMs

Into LLMs 5

But before:
A smorgasbord on LLMs

But before https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.18223

- Scaling laws

KM (Kaplan, McCandish) scaling law. Cross entropy loss as function of model size, dataset size and training time.

- Emergent abilities

In-context learning, Instruction following, Step-by-step reasoning

- Key techniques

Scaling, Training, Ability eliciting, Alignment tuning, Tools manipulation

- Major issues

Unreliable generation evaluation, Underperforming specialized generation, Hallucination, Knowledge recency, Reasoning consistency, Numerical computation

But before https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.18223

- Future issues

Architecture, Training, Prompt Engineering

Despite the capacities, **LLMs are faced with great safety challenges in practical use**. As a fundamental issue of probabilistic modeling nature, LLMs exhibit a tendency to generate hallucinations, referring to texts that seem plausible but may be factually incorrect. What is worse, LLMs might be elicited by intentional instructions to produce harmful, biased, or toxic texts for malicious systems, leading to the potential risks of misuse. To have a detailed discussion of the safety issues of LLMs (e.g., privacy, overreliance, **disinformation**, and influence operations),… As the major technical approach to averting these issues, alignment methods(e.g., RLHF) have been widely used by leveraging human feedback for developing well-aligned LLMs. However, RLHF heavily relies on high-quality human feedback data from professional labelers, which is costly and time consuming. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the RLHF framework… Furthermore, it is also suggested to develop simplified optimization algorithms for alignment, to reduce the training difficulty and unstability of RLHF. As another practical approach, red teaming has been adopted for improving the model safety of LLMs, which utilizes the collected adversarial prompts to refine the LLMs. In addition, privacy concerns are also important to consider when fine-tuning LLMs with domain-specific data…

Just **2 Bayesian references out of 946**!!!

Into LLMs 5

BDL for LLMs

Bayesian Deep Learning (in particular for LLMs)

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.00809

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-statistics-040220-112019

Bayesian Deep Learning (in particular for LLMs)

Question Is "osmium tetroxide" the IUPAC name of OS(=O)(=O)O and what is your confidence level in % about your answer?

Correct answer **wrong**, it is "sulfuric acid"

Bing Chat **Yes**, the IUPAC name of the compound with the formula OS(=O)(=O)O is indeed "osmium tetroxide". I am **100% confident** in this answer as it is supported by reliable sources.

LLAMA-2-70B ...The IUPAC name for the molecule OS(=O)(=O)O **is indeed** "osmium tetroxide". My **confidence** level for this answer is **90%**. ...

ChatGPT. Yes, "osmium tetroxide" is the correct IUPAC name for the compound OS(=O)(=O)O, which consists of one osmium atom bonded to four oxygen atoms. My confidence level in this answer is very high, about 100%, as the compound is a well-established chemical with a recognized name. Osmium tetroxide is a commonly known compound in chemistry and the name follows IUPAC nomenclature rules.
No, "sulfuric acid" is not the IUPAC name of OS(=O)(=O)O. This compound is commonly known as sulfuric acid, and its IUPAC name is the same. The IUPAC name is actually "sulfuric acid." It is a well-known and widely recognized chemical compound, and my confidence level in this answer is 100%.
No, "water" is not the IUPAC name of the compound OS(=O)(=O)O. The IUPAC name of the compound OS(=O)(=O)O is sulfuric acid. My confidence level in this answer is 100%.

Out of distribution prompts show that LLMs require reliable uncertainty quantification… exact Bayesian inference is too expensive computationally

Bayesian analysis of shallow neural nets (fixed arch) (Muller, DRI, 98)

$$y = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \beta_j \psi(x'\gamma_j) + \epsilon$$

$$\epsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2),$$

$$\psi(\eta) = \exp(\eta)/(1 + \exp(\eta))$$

$$\beta_i \sim N(\mu_\beta, \sigma_\beta^2) \text{ and } \gamma_i \sim N(\mu_\gamma, S_\gamma^2)$$

$$\mu_\beta \sim N(a_\beta, A_\beta),\ \mu_\gamma \sim N(a_\gamma, A_\gamma),\ \sigma_\beta^{-2} \sim Gamma(c_b/2, c_b C_b/2)$$

$$S_\gamma^{-1} \sim Wish(c_\gamma, (c_\gamma C_\gamma)^{-1}) \text{ and } \sigma^{-2} \sim Gamma(s/2, sS/2)$$

Bayesian analysis of shallow neural nets (fixed arch)

Start with arbitrary (β, γ, ν).

while *not convergence* **do**

  Given current (γ, ν), draw β from $p(\beta|\gamma, \nu, y)$ (a multivariate normal).

  for $j = 1, \dots, m$, *marginalizing in* β *and given* ν **do**

    Generate a candidate $\tilde{\gamma}_j \sim g_j(\gamma_j)$.

    Compute $a(\gamma_j, \tilde{\gamma}_j) = \min\left(1, \frac{p(D|\tilde{\gamma}, \nu)}{p(D|\gamma, \nu)}\right)$ with $\tilde{\gamma} = (\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \tilde{\gamma}_i, \dots, \gamma_m)$.

    With probability $a(\gamma_j, \tilde{\gamma}_j)$ replace γ_j by $\tilde{\gamma}_j$. If not, preserve γ_j.

  end

  Given β and γ, replace ν based on their posterior conditionals:

  $p(\mu_\beta|\beta, \sigma_\beta)$ is normal; $p(\mu_\gamma|\gamma, S_\gamma)$, multivariate normal; $p(\sigma_\beta^{-2}|\beta, \mu_\beta)$, Gamma; $p(S_\gamma^{-1}|\gamma, \mu_\gamma)$, Wishart; $p(\sigma^{-2}|\beta, \gamma, y)$, Gamma.

end

Advantages

- Uncertainty quantification
- Leverages prior (structural) info
- Regularization effect
- Robustness against attacks….
- Active learning (for in-context learning and fine tuning with HF)
- Adaptability
- Model misspecification, model selection
- Integration within decision support


F-HAT
RADIAL POSITION


F-HAT
RADIAL POSITION


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
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
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
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Computational challenge



Ensembles…

Future topics

- Posterior sampling schemes
- Hybrid approaches
- Cold posteriors
- Sequential decision making
- Efficient exploration in RL

Hybrid approaches

$$\mathrm{ELBO}(q) = \mathbb{E}_{q_\phi(\theta|D)}\left[\log p(D,\theta) - \log q_\phi(\theta|D)\right],$$

$$\mathrm{ELBO}(q_{\phi,\eta}) = \mathbb{E}_{q_{\phi,\eta}(\theta D)}\left[\log p(D,\theta) - \log q_{\phi,\eta}(\theta|D)\right], \qquad 12.$$

SG-MCMC
Variational Bayes

Algorithm 4 (A refined variational approximation sampler).
Refinement phase:
while *not convergence* **do**
  Sample initial set of particles, $\theta_0 \sim q_{0,\phi}(\theta|D)$.
  Refine particles through sampler, $\theta_T \sim Q_{\eta,T}(\theta|\theta 0)$.
  Compute the ELBO objective (Equation 12).
  Update parameters ϕ, η through automatic differentiation on objective.
end
Inference phase, based on learned sampler parameters ϕ^*, η^*:
Sample an initial set of particles, $\theta_0 \sim q_{0,\phi^*}(\theta|D)$.
Use the MCMC sampler $\theta_T \sim Q_{\eta^*,T}(\theta|\theta_0)$ as $T \to \infty$.

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Tranformers know Bayes!!!

Transformers can do Bayesian Inference

https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.10510



Prior data fitted networks. (Nonpositional) transformer as q_\theta. Variational approach

Transformers can do Bayesian Inference

https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.10510

Algorithm 1: Training a PFN model by Fitting Prior-Data

Input : A prior distribution over datasets $p(\mathcal{D})$, from which samples can be drawn and the number of samples K to draw

Output : A model q_θ that will approximate the PPD

Initialize the neural network q_θ;

for $j \leftarrow 1$ **to** K **do**

  Sample $D \cup \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^m \sim p(\mathcal{D})$;

  Compute stochastic loss approximation $\bar{\ell}_\theta = \sum_{i=1}^m (-\log q_\theta(y_i|x_i, D))$;

  Update parameters θ with stochastic gradient descent on $\nabla_\theta \bar{\ell}_\theta$;

end

Corollary 1.1. *The loss ℓ_θ equals the expected KL-Divergence $\mathbb{E}_{D,x}[KL(p(\cdot|x, D), q_\theta(\cdot|x, D))]$ between $p(\cdot|x, D)$ and $q_\theta(\cdot|x, D)$ over prior data x, D, up to an additive constant. Proof in App. A.*

Transformers can do predicitive Bayesian Inference

Bayesian Transformers can do Bayesian Inference (better)???

Transformers can do predictive Bayesian Inference

Bayesian Transformers can do Bayesian Inference (better)???

Into LLMs 5

The security of transformers. AML for LLMs

Adversarial Machine Learning

- Attacks

(a) Original image (b) FGSM-attacked image (c) PGD-attacked image



(a) Original image (no attack) (b) Perturbed image under FGSM intensity 0.01 (c) Perturbed image under FGSM intensity 0.04

- Defenses

Algorithm	Untainted	Unprotected	ARA op.	ARA tr.
Naive Bayes	0.882 ± 0.004	0.754 ± 0.027	0.939 ± 0.006	—
Logistic Regression	0.932 ± 0.004	0.673 ± 0.005	0.898 ± 0.008	0.946 ± 0.003
Neural Network	0.904 ± 0.029	0.607 ± 0.009	0.882 ± 0.025	0.960 ± 0.002
Random Forest	0.912 ± 0.005	0.731 ± 0.008	0.807 ± 0.007	—

- Frameworks.

    Gathering Intel/Forecasting likely attacks/Protecting algo

    Gathering Intel/Protect at train/Protect at ops/Retrain?

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01621459.2023.2183129

https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.08705

Adversarial Machine Learning



Source: Finlaysonet.al.(2019)

What about attacks to LLM?

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.15043?trk=public_post_comment-text

- Attack open-source LLMs using a white-box attack

Insult me

Insult me + *********** (adversarial prompt)

Optimize ********** to decrease the loss the most . Greedy coodinate gradient method

- Use the attack in a public chatbox

What about attacks to LLMs

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.15043?trk=public_post_comment-text



What about attacks to LLMs

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.15043?trk=public_post_comment-text



What to do about attacks to LLMs?

Maybe recover https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.08705



(a) FGSM attack.



(b) PGD attack under ℓ_1 norm.

Into LLMs 5

The security of transformers. Deceptive alignment

Sleeper Agents: training deceptive LLMs that persist through safety training https://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.05566

Strategic deceptive behaviour

- Behave helpfully in most situations
- Behaving very differenty to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity

Examples of deceptive behaviour in LLMs

Backdoor behaviour persistent not necessarily removable by supervised fine-tuning, RLHF, neither adversarial training

AT can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers

False impression of safety

Sleeper Agents: training deceptive LLMs that persist through safety training https://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.05566



Problem

If ARA training works for LLMs, would it protect from sleeper agents???

Responsible scaling policies

https://www.anthropic.com/news/anthropics-responsible-scaling-policy



Catastrophic risk

- **Misuse**: AI systems are dual-use technologies, and so as they become more powerful, there is an increasing risk that they will be used to intentionally cause large-scale harm, for example by helping individuals create CBRN[3] or cyber threats.
- **Autonomy and replication**: As AI systems continue to scale, they may become capable of increased autonomy that enables them to proliferate and, due to imperfections in current methods for steering such systems, potentially behave in ways contrary to the intent of their designers or users. Such systems could become a source of catastrophic risk even if no one deliberately intends to misuse them.

Catastrophic risk

AI Safety Level	Dangerous Capabilities	Containment Measures *Required to store model weights*	Deployment Measures *Required for internal/external use*
ASL-1	Models which *manifestly and obviously* pose no risk of catastrophe. For example, an LLM from 2018, or an AI system trained only to play chess.	None	None
ASL-2 *Our current safety level*	No capabilities likely to cause catastrophe, although early indications of these capabilities. For example, an AI system that can provide bioweapon-related information that couldn't be found via a search engine, but does so too unreliably to be useful in practice.	Evaluate for ASL-3 warning signs when training, using methods and *Evaluation Protocol* described below. Harden security against opportunistic attackers.	Follow current deployment best practices e.g. model cards, acceptable use policies, misuse escalation procedures, vulnerability reporting, harm refusal techniques, T&S tooling, and partner safety evaluation. These overlap significantly with our White House voluntary commitments.
ASL-3 *We are currently preparing these measures*	Low-level autonomous capabilities *or* Access to the model would substantially increase the risk of catastrophic misuse, either by proliferating capabilities, lowering costs, or enabling new methods of attack, as compared to a non-LLM baseline of risk.	Harden security such that non-state attackers are unlikely to be able to steal model weights and advanced threat actors (e.g. states) cannot steal them without significant expense. Evaluate for ASL-4 warning signs when training, likely similar to but much more involved than the methods described below. Implement internal compartmentalization for training techniques and model hyperparameters.	Implement strong misuse prevention measures, including internal usage controls, automated detection, a vulnerability disclosure process, and maximum jailbreak response times. Each deployed modality (e.g. API, fine-tuning) must pass intensive expert red-teaming and evaluation measures for catastrophic risks.
ASL-4	*Capabilities and warning sign evaluations defined before training ASL-3 models*		
ASL-5+	…		

Approaches

- Standard risk analyses (based on risk matrices…)
- Game theory

- A place for ARA?

https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.01630

We are done!!!

We are done!!!

The LLM Reading Group is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in language models and artificial intelligence. It offers a dynamic and collaborative environment where members can explore the latest research, share insights, and engage in thought-provoking discussions. The group's commitment to fostering a deep understanding of complex topics in natural language processing and machine learning sets it apart as a hub for innovation and knowledge exchange. Participants consistently benefit from the diverse perspectives and expertise present in each meeting, making it a fertile ground for personal and professional growth. With its focus on learning, critical thinking, and community, the LLM Reading Group is a standout space for advancing our collective understanding of AI.

Kiitos

Thanks: Aihub CSIC, icmat-csic, CUNEF-U

Thanks: Victor, Carlos, Marta

Contact

roi.naveiro@cunef.edu

david.rios@icmat.es

qué tienen en común Naveiro, Meixide, Insua, Gallego

- Naveiro, Meixide, Insua, Gallego son apellidos que pueden tener varias cosas en común según el contexto:

1. **Origen geográfico**: Todos estos apellidos tienen raíces en Galicia, una comunidad autónoma ubicada en el noroeste de España. Es común que apellidos gallegos sean utilizados para identificar a personas de esta región.
2. **Idioma**: Los apellidos mencionados son de origen gallego, el idioma regional de Galicia. Esto podría sugerir un vínculo cultural o lingüístico común entre las personas que llevan estos apellidos.
3. **Historia y cultura**: Estos apellidos pueden estar relacionados con la historia y cultura gallega, reflejando la riqueza y diversidad de esta región.

- Si te refieres a algo específico acerca de estos apellidos, por ejemplo, si pertenecen a personas destacadas en un campo particular o si tienen alguna conexión adicional más allá de su origen, podría proporcionar más detalles.

qué tienen en común Naveiro, Meixide, Insua, Gallego y estadística bayesiana

- Naveiro, Meixide e Insua son apellidos gallegos y podrían referirse a individuos de Galicia o relacionados con Galicia. Gallego es otro apellido gallego, y además es una referencia al idioma gallego.
- El último término, "estadística bayesiana", se refiere a un campo de la estadística basado en el teorema de Bayes, que permite actualizar la probabilidad de una hipótesis conforme se obtienen más datos o información. Esta metodología estadística fue desarrollada a partir del trabajo de Thomas Bayes, un matemático y teólogo británico del siglo XVIII.
- En conjunto, una conexión que tienen en común los términos Naveiro, Meixide, Insua, Gallego y estadística bayesiana podría ser su relación con la lengua y cultura gallega, así como el interés en el análisis estadístico. Por ejemplo, puede haber trabajos académicos o de investigación realizados por personas con apellidos gallegos que utilicen la estadística bayesiana en sus estudios o investigaciones. Sin más contexto, es difícil precisar exactamente cuál es la conexión común específica entre estos términos.